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Abstract 
‘Hybrid warfare’, sometimes known as ‘hybrid threats’, became a trendy buzzword in 
recent years, used to describe a panoply of seemingly different threats. While neither 
the European Union (EU) nor the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) appear to 
have a clear definition of this term, both organisations are taking steps to ‘counter 
hybrid’. This paper explores why this terminology has been adopted by both 
organisations and seeks to understand how this semantic choice influenced their 
respective policy responses as well as their cooperation. By analysing what hybrid 
means and which actors are designated with this label, I show that both NATO and 
the EU used hybrid to describe their vulnerability to a rapidly changing strategic 
environment. Although no final definition of hybrid has materialised, the term has 
allowed for increased informal and formal NATO-EU cooperation. 
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Introducing ‘hybrid’ 
“No-one should be under any illusion but that the threat posed by hybrid warfare is real”, 
read the website of the European People’s Party Group in April 2016. 1  Such ominous 
statements became a constant feature of the political, media and academic landscape in 
recent years. In Europe and across the Atlantic, think tanks organised events on hybrid, 
publications multiplied and policy-makers at times managed to grasp a headline with a 
catchy reference to hybrid threats or war. Hybrid is a buzzword, and as such it is remarkable 
for its evolution as well as for the fact that no agreed definition for it has so far emerged. 
While the term has been used across the Atlantic for over a decade, it has only slowly gained 
popularity in Europe. Given the importance hybrid gained for both the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), it seems crucial to analyse how we 
arrived at a point where both organisations issued strategies seeking to ‘counter hybrid’. 
To explain these developments, this paper seeks to comparatively assesses EU and 
NATO approaches to hybrid by seeking to answer two questions: Why has hybrid been 
adopted as the terminology of choice by both NATO and the EU to describe their security 
environment? To what extent has this semantic choice influenced actual policy responses 
and the cooperation between the two organisations? 
The hypothesis guiding my analysis is that both organisations adopted hybrid because 
of their perceived vulnerability to a changed security environment. More importantly, hybrid 
seems to have become a catalyst for increased EU-NATO cooperation, notably carrying an 
important symbolic dimension. To verify this hypothesis, it is first imperative to understand how 
hybrid evolved as a term. Second, a precondition for understanding concrete EU or NATO 
policies is to identify threats which were designated as hybrid. Lastly, after analysing the 
respective NATO and EU responses to hybrid, EU-NATO cooperation on the subject needs to 
be analysed. 
Given the qualitative nature of this analysis, as well as the sparse availability of 
unclassified sources, my work combines the analysis of primary sources and secondary 
literature, enriched by interviews conducted with NATO and EU officials and academics. This 
allowed me to gain insight into the real perception of hybrid within the two institutions, 
meaning, however, that my analysis is the sum of a range of subjective perceptions of the 
term and accompanying institutional processes. 
                                                 
1 European Parliament, EPP Group, The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting, 
Brussels, 19 April 2016. 
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Getting across the semantic minefield 
Hybridity became very fashionable in academic and policy-making circles in recent years. 
As with any neologism, the precise meaning of the term is still very fluid and adaptable to 
the situation which is being described. The semantic dust has therefore not yet settled on an 
agreed definition, meaning policy-makers use the term to describe emerging challenges, 
while academia is racing to coin a workable definition or model for hybridity. This section 
aims to show how hybrid came to be, which elements were perceived as constitutive of 
hybridity and which challenges the use of this terminology inevitably triggered. 
The first time hybrid was used to describe war, has been dated to a thesis written in 
2002 by W. Nemeth.2 Since then, the term gradually gained popularity within military circles, 
especially in the US Marine Corps, and was subsequently adopted by the US Department of 
Defense in order to capture the evolving character of conflict.3 One military theorist, LtCol. 
Frank Hoffman, significantly contributed to the popularisation of the term, studying hybrid 
war through historical examples of deliberate creation of uncertainty within the 
battlespace.4 As Freedman noted, hybrid warfare gained popularity after being used by 
Hoffman to describe Hizbullah tactics simultaneously employing conventional and guerrilla 
modus operandi in the 2006 Lebanon war.5 The term only proliferated from 2008 onwards, 
however, largely due to NATO and its Allied Command Transformation.6 The interconnected 
nature of military and policy circles within NATO was indeed the vehicle through which hybrid 
warfare was mainstreamed. Throughout its journey, this neologism kept evolving, with each 
use picking up more constituent elements, so that it “was no longer limited to a specific 
portion of the capability spectrum between irregular and conventional warfare, but now 
started to embrace any aspect related to the increasing complexity of modern conflicts”.7 
Crossing the Atlantic naturally made the term more vulnerable to the use by a broader range 
of actors with different threat prioritisations, all perceiving novel elements in their individual 
security environments. Thus, some argue that “[e]ach member state, sub-agency or center 
of excellence understood [hybrid warfare] its own way, so that they could use it to push their 
                                                 
2 See EUISS, “What We Talk about, When We Talk about ‘Hybrid Threats’”, EUISS Research Paper, Paris, 
2015. 
3 F. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats”, War on the Rocks, Online 
Article, July 2014. 
4 Ibid.  
5 L. Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War”, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, 2014, pp. 10-11. 
6 E. Tenenbaum, “Hybrid Warfare in the Strategic Spectrum”, NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 24, 
2015, pp. 97-98. 
7 Ibid. 
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own agenda”.8 In sum, hybrid became a tool for describing situations which did not fit 
existing definitions of warfare, and it was already in use at NATO when the illegal annexation 
of Crimea and destabilisation of the East of Ukraine by Russia took place. Hybrid war was 
thus adopted for describing these unexpected Russian actions, which did not fit within 
existing NATO concepts.9 
The interlinked nature of the security and defence policy circles in Europe ensured the 
amalgamation of many additional elements within the main hybrid warfare/threats 
terminology. While hybrid was gaining popularity, other terms such as ‘ambiguous warfare’ 
(reportedly preferred by the United Kingdom10), ‘limited’,11 ‘nonlinear’ or ‘special’ war, were 
losing ground.12 Not surprisingly, terms like the Cold War-era ‘political warfare’13 made a 
return in the literature, and hybrid warfare was regularly compared to ‘asymmetric’ or 
’irregular’ warfare, two terms described by some as lacking “any discernible analytical 
value”.14 One interesting term, ‘the grey zone’, made its appearance more recently, and is 
paradoxically broader than hybrid warfare itself. As Paul aptly noted, “[l]ike hybrid threats, if 
everything is in the grey zone, then nothing is”.15 
A good starting point to provide an overview of elements which make hybrid warfare 
or threats hybrid in expert literature, seems to be Hoffman’s definition, as he largely 
contributed to establishing hybrid in US military thinking: 
Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state 
actors. [They] incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including 
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts 
including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. These 
multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the 
same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and 
coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects.16 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 K. Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s 
Exercise of Power”, Chatham House Research Paper, London, RUSI, 2016, p. 7. 
10 Giles, “Is Hybrid Warfare Really New?”, NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 24, 2015, p. 321. 
11 Freedman, op. cit., p. 10. 
12 Giles, op. cit., RUSI, p. 6. 
13 Hoffman, op. cit., 2014. 
14 F. Alamir, “‘Hybrid Warfare’: A Possible Trigger for Advances in the Comprehensive Approach?”, 
Ethics and Armed Forces, no. 2, 2015, p. 3. 
15 C. Paul, “Confessions of a Hybrid Warfare Skeptic”, Small Wars Journal, Online Article, 3 March 2016. 
16 Hoffman as cited in M. Miller, Hybrid Warfare: Preparing for Future Conflict, Air War College, Air 
University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2015, p. 7. 
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His take on hybrid warfare is confined to the battlespace, seeking to denote a departure 
from conventional warfare through increased complexity. Another definition, from a 2010 
NATO Capstone project, defined hybrid threats as "those posed by adversaries, with the 
ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in 
pursuit of their objectives”, showcasing the view that a simple combination of different 
elements was making a threat hybrid.17 Subsequent definitions, however, included a broader 
range of understandings, the only common thread being a disclaimer stating that hybrid is 
in fact nothing new. If so, why use it? 
I understand definitions of hybrid warfare and hybrid threats as putting the emphasis 
on three core elements: dynamism, complexity and simultaneity. As some authors note, 
“hybrid wars are complex, because they don’t conform to a one-size-fits-all pattern”.18 They 
involve a plurality of actors (both state and non-state)19 and present “tactics [which] can be 
scaled and tailor fit to the particular situation”.20 Suggesting a dual nature of its component 
parts, hybrid is inherently heterogeneous21 and, as Drent and others observe, the “core 
strength of hybrid warfare is that it can morph in nature [which] results in (the possibility of) 
constantly differing encountered and observed characteristics”.22 What seems crucial here, 
is the departure from clear-cut goals of military action. As Kramer and colleagues point out, 
“[p]ractitioners of hybrid warfare are often less intent on seizing and holding territory than 
destroying or disrupting the ability of societies to function”.23 Other researchers illustrated the 
difficulty of defining hybrid by pointing out that one agent can present both a hybrid and a 
non-hybrid threat, thus necessitating “conceptual coherence”.24 
In this respect, it is worth noting that there is no clear differentiation between definitions 
of hybrid threats/warfare. As illustrated by the US Government Accountability Office, similar 
                                                 
17 J. Davis, “Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats: The Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need 
for Innovation”, The Three Swords Magazine, issue 28, 2015, p. 20. 
18 G. Lasconjarias & J. Larsen, “A New Way of Warfare”, NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 24, 2015, 
p. 3. 
19 A. Jacobs & G. Lasconjarias, “NATO's Hybrid Flanks - Handling Unconventional Warfare in the South 
and the East”, NATO Research Paper, no. 112, Brussels, April 2015, p. 3. 
20  J. Miranda-Calha, Hybrid Warfare: NATO’s New Strategic Challenge?, NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, 166 DSC 15 E bis, 2015, p. 3. 
21 Jacobs & Lasconjarias, op. cit., p. 2. 
22 M. Drent et al., New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2015, 
p. 29. 
23 F. Kramer et al., “NATO’s New Strategy: Stability Generation”, Atlantic Council, September 2015, 
Washington, D.C., pp. 4-5. 
24 EUISS, op. cit. 
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definitions were applied to both terms within the same departments. 25  In Europe, 
understandings of hybrid warfare or threats also vary significantly from one official to another.  
By virtue of its popularity, hybrid warfare lent itself to significant criticism since its 
emergence. Besides the inherent imprecision26 of this terminology, many authors took issue 
with the use of the word ‘war’ to describe activities in the diplomatic, information, economic 
or energy domains. 27  One of the fiercest critics of the term has been Elie Tenenbaum. 
Comparing the concept to an “auberge espagnole stratégique”,28 the author denounced 
the fact that it “has been diluted to the point of absurdity”.29 Tenenbaum saw the use of 
force as the necessary element for the application of this label30 and the hybrid warfare 
terminology as critical for the bureaucratic survival of many NATO support structures such as 
think tanks and centres of excellence (COEs) which, for him, deliberately skewed the 
meaning of the concept to fit their competence area.31 
Other critics are even more sceptical. While some see hybrid warfare as “nothing more 
than a semantic brand for the current practice of ‘muddling through’ in security policy”,32 
others interpret it as “[t]he West […] terrorizing itself with specters of hybrid war to an extent 
that it should qualify as one of history’s better disinformation operations, even if it was wholly 
unintentional”.33 “Frustration” with the term, has even led experts like Sven Biscop to write 
pieces against its use,34 arguing that “one cannot make strategy against an adjective”.35 As 
for solutions, Van Puyvelde advocated in a similar vein that “decision-makers should stay 
away from [hybrid] and consider warfare for what it has always been: a complex set of 
interconnected threats and forceful means waged to further political motives”.36 Returning 
to past ways of conceiving warfare, however, carries the risk of ignoring the fundamental 
idea at the core of the hybrid concept, namely that something has changed. 
                                                 
25 US Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, GAO-10-1036R, Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 
18. 
26 M. Kofman & M. Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’”, Kennan Cable, no. 7, 2015, p. 2. 
27 E. Tenenbaum, “Le piège de la guerre hybride”, Focus stratégique, Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales, no. 63, 2015, p. 25. 
28 Ibid., p. 9. 
29 Tenenbaum, op. cit., NATO Defence College, p. 95. 
30 Tenenbaum, op. cit., IFRI, p. 22. 
31 Ibid., p. 35. 
32  H. Münkler, “Hybrid Wars: The Dissolution of the Binary Order of War and Peace, and Its 
Consequences”, Ethics and Armed Forces, vol. 2, 2015, p. 23. 
33 Kofman, op. cit. 
34 Interview with Prof. Sven Biscop, Director Egmont Institute, Bruges, 9 March 2016.  
35 Biscop, “Hybrid Hysteria”, Egmont Security Policy Brief, no. 64, 2015, pp. 2-4. 
36 D. Van Puyvelde, “Hybrid War – Does It even Exist?”, NATO Review, Brussels, May 2015. 
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Based on these considerations, I propose the following definition of the ‘hybrid 
opponent’: Seeking to exploit the full range of a target’s weaknesses, a hybrid opponent 
possesses the capacity of simultaneous escalation, at different points along the broadly-
defined spectrum of conflict, transcending the battlefield at will to target state or society. 
Constantly adapting, a hybrid opponent can use different channels and proxies, often 
making attribution difficult, using unlawful actions and, at times, seemingly acting without a 
clear strategic objective. 
To conclude this part, while some maintain that “hybridity indicates the indefinability 
of the thing so described”, 37  others believe that it offers positive insights which justify 
continued refinement by academia.38 In this respect, Hoffman argued that, 
[i]f at the end of the day we drop the “hybrid” term and simply gain a better 
understanding of the large gray space between our idealized bins and pristine 
Western categorizations, we will have made progress.39  
Similarly, Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen argued that hybrid is a “useful concept”,40 seeing 
it as highlighting the “intellectual challenges adversaries are bringing to the table in terms of 
what war is and how it should be understood”.41 This warrants an analysis of which threats 
are labelled as hybrid. 
 
Hybrid in a changing strategic landscape 
The hybrid warfare/threat terminology was inevitably shaped by the timeline in which it 
emerged. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen argue that hybrid warfare “was deduced from 
looking at the enemy, thus shifting its definition and meaning, according to the subject of 
analysis”. 42  Understanding to whom this label is ascribed is thus a precondition for 
understanding any policy responses to hybrid. 
 
Hybrid warriors – they came from the East 
In Western perceptions, Russia is the embodiment of an actor conducting hybrid warfare. As 
Johnson notes, after the start of the Russian aggression on Ukraine, its actions were “initially 
                                                 
37 Münkler, op. cit., p. 20. 
38 Paul, op. cit. 
39 Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound Ear: The Janus Choice: Defining Today’s Multifaceted Conflict”, 
Armed Forces Journal, 2009. 
40 E. Reichborn-Kjennerud & P. Cullen. "What is Hybrid Warfare?", Policy Brief, no. 1, Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs, 2016, p. 4. 
41 Ibid., p. 1. 
42 Ibid. 
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labelled by some in the West […] as ‘hybrid’ warfare and treated as a new phenomenon”.43 
This speaks to the element of ‘surprise’, making hybrid warfare a quick fix for an inability to 
explain events, which only a handful of experts have anticipated. The fact that hybrid 
became the prevalent terminology to describe Russia’s actions does not necessarily help our 
analysis, as “what Russian hybrid warfare is and how it works, varies dramatically depending 
on what report or PowerPoint brief you are reading”.44 Although an extensive analysis of the 
Russian hybrid threat is outside the scope of this work, some elements are needed. 
According to Maj. Davis Jr., “[t]he Russians have been able to combine various military 
forms of warfare with economic, information, and diplomatic [instruments of power] into 
essentially a hybrid threat whole of government approach”.45 As elaborated by Ruiz-Palmer, 
“hybrid warfare bridges the divide between the hard and the soft power applications that 
result from the technological and information revolutions of the last three decades in ways 
that maximize asymmetric advantages for Russia, as well as minimize risks and costs”.46 This 
hints at a perception of Russia having a clear strategic design and a hybrid methodology to 
carry it out cost-effectively. This approach is illustrated by some publications stating that “[a] 
clear goal of Russia’s use of hybrid tactics is to sow doubts about the nature and severity of 
the threat any particular action may pose”.47 On the other hand, experts argue that “against 
the backdrop of Russian aggression against Ukraine […] even routine military behaviour 
translates into a signal”, 48 pointing to the importance of perception and own vulnerability. 
The above-mentioned examples serve to illustrate my point that, not only was hybrid 
warfare, as Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen argued, “deduced from looking at the 
enemy”,49 but it was also deduced by looking in the mirror – the product of a sudden 
realisation of Western weakness and vulnerabilities when faced with an increasingly 
uncertain environment. In this respect, Ruiz Palmer argues that,  
Russia’s adoption of hybrid warfare is the product of a combination of strategic 
opportunity and necessity, tailored to today’s environment of heightened societal 
connectivity, fragility and vulnerability – the opportunity to pursue and achieve policy 
                                                 
43 D. Johnson, “Russia’s Approach to Conflict: Implications for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence”, 
NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 24, 2015, p. 137. 
44 Kofman, op. cit. 
45 Davis, op. cit., p. 23. 
46 D. Ruiz-Palmer, “Back to the Future? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold 
War Comparisons”, NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 24, 2015, p. 51. 
47 Miranda-Calha, op. cit., p. 4. 
48 J. Durkalec, “Nuclear-Backed “Little Green Men: Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis”, PISM 
Report, Warsaw, July 2015, p. 15. 
49 Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen, op. cit., p. 1. 
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objectives of the highest importance through the active, but calibrated, employment 
of mostly non-military means, together with the necessity to avoid a highly destructive, 
and potentially decisive, use of force by an adversary.50 
This idea helps explain the initial opposition of Poland, the Baltic states and others to the 
“framing of Russian operations within a concept of hybridity”, 51  since they saw it as 
avoidance of concrete actions to counter Russia in the event of an operation “categorized 
as being under a threshold of war”.52 Early reluctance of these states to classify Russian 
actions as hybrid was thus paradoxically an expression of vulnerability to what is routinely 
accepted to be part of hybrid warfare: the sewing of divisions within intergovernmental 
decision-making systems.  
The hybrid debate led authors like Thornton to conclude that “[t]he West must adjust 
to the situation in which it now finds itself in relation to Russia – a ‘permanent’ hybrid war”, 53 
referring to Russian General Gerasimov. 54  Although understanding Russia through this 
‘Gerasimov doctrine’ became popular in some circles, it has largely been dismissed as a 
case of “buzzwords becoming fixed features of our cognitive landscape, simply because 
they fit neatly on a PowerPoint slide”.55 To be precise, making sure to base one’s analysis on 
facts does not diminish Russia’s revisionist and illegal actions. The principal question, however, 
is to distinguish between truly novel elements and ones in which the sole innovation is the 
“exploitation of ambiguity, both of intent and attribution”, which itself is drawing on previous 
Russian and Soviet practices.56  
Being able to evaluate intent seems paramount. Indeed, while some see Russian 
actions, for example in the information sphere, as “opportunistically [trying] to ‘stir the pot’ of 
public discontent and distrust”, the difficulty lies in determining whether this is an integral part 
of a fully articulated strategy.57 Providing an answer to this question lies beyond the scope of 
this work, but does point to the underlying problem of “the loss of analytical depth and 
institutional memory […] to examine Russia’s intentions and aspirations”,58 as has been further 
demonstrated by ongoing discussions of Russian ‘meddling’ in various Western elections. 
                                                 
50 Ruiz-Palmer, op. cit., p. 50. 
51 Giles, op. cit., RUSI, p. 7. 
52 N. Schadlow, “The Problem with Hybrid Warfare”, War on the Rocks, Online Article, April 2015. 
53 R. Thornton, “The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 4, no. 160, 2015, p. 46. 
54 Ibid., p. 42. 
55 Giles, op. cit., RUSI, p. 10. 
56 Johnson, op. cit., p. 137. 
57 Kofman & Rojansky, op. cit., p. 6. 
58 Giles, op. cit., RUSI, p. 61. 
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Parallel southern threats 
The hybrid threat known as the Islamic State will inevitably thrive if we collectively fail 
to […] encourage new models of government that guarantee basic human rights 
while respecting prevailing cultural norms.59 
Evidence of a parallel diffusion of hybrid terminology within separate expert circles is 
illustrative of the dilemmas institutions like NATO or the EU face today. Indeed, problems with 
delimiting the scope of what constitutes hybrid were particularly well captured by US 
Secretary of Defence Ash Carter arguing that 
[hybrid warfare] has two aspects to it […]. One is terrorism, which is sub-state actors 
wielding that destructive power. Unfortunately there are also states that use the same 
instruments and the same vulnerabilities for more traditional purposes. And that’s true 
whether it’s little green men in Ukraine. Or, as to be blunt about it and something 
we’ve objected to, actors in China stealing intellectual property and not being 
apprehended and stopped from doing it. [From] China to the Iranian government 
aiding the Houthis or contributing to Hezbollah. This kind of thing also, that’s what 
hybrid warfare is.60 
With similar semantic generosity, a European Parliamentary Research Service document 
provides an extensive list of hybrid threats, which includes among others, Russian special 
operations in Ukraine, terrorist organisations, state-affiliated hackers, drug cartels, China’s 
policies in the South China Sea, as well as resource scarcity.61 
While France used hybrid “in its 2013 defense review with the jihadist nexus in Sahel in 
mind”, in the current European strategic environment the other major hybrid threat besides 
Russia, is perceived to be the Islamic State (IS).62 As described by the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, “[IS] can be termed a hybrid threat due to its effective ability to employ a range 
of tactics from terrorist to conventional and its global recruitment networks to rally thousands 
of fighters to its cause”.63 This speaks to the idea that hybrid became a shorthand used to 
describe actors threatening Western vulnerabilities, or even to denote the use of instruments 
of statehood one disagrees with. A paradoxical dimension of this has been captured by 
Drent and others, who noted that both the IS’s modus operandi of publicising its acts of 
                                                 
59 S. Jasper & S. Moreland, "The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter?", Small Wars 
Journal, Online Article, 2014. 
60 US Department of Defense, Transcript “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter in Plenary 
Session at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland”, January 2016. 
61 P. Pawlak, “Understanding Hybrid Threats”, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 564.355, 
Brussels, June 2015. 
62 Tenenbaum, op. cit., NATO Defence College, pp. 97-98. 
63 Miranda-Calha, op. cit., p. 7. 
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violence to generate fear and recruitment, and Russia’s denial of involvement in the 
Donbass, were perceived as hybrid.64 
Finally, a refreshing approach for understanding which threats deserve this label might 
be to proceed by elimination. As Gunneriusson and Ottis very aptly put it,  
Hybrid threats are not defined by the actors, since states, non‐state actors and even 
individuals might be considered (part of) hybrid threats. They are not about some 
specific technology, since the list here keeps growing as new technologies become 
available. They are not about specific effects, as a hybrid campaign may result in 
casualties, changed decisions, altered public perception, etc. Perhaps the best way 
to put it, hybrid threat is a manifestation of total war.65 
In sum, I see hybrid terminology as conducive to apophenia (meaning the tendency of 
seeking patterns) and leading to an amalgamation of diverse threats, at the risk of 
disregarding key differences between them. Having shown a parallel diffusion of hybrid 
terminology to denote a wide range of threats, the next step is to evaluate whether this 
semantic ambiguity translated into policy responses meant to ‘counter hybrid’. 
 
A changing understanding of war 
Hoffman argued that our Russian and Chinese competitors “do not delude themselves with 
neat orthodoxies about categories and Clausewitzian models about how ‘real wars’ are 
fought and won” and that “[n]either should we”.66 This idea is based in part on the work 
“Unrestricted War”, written in 1999 by two Chinese People's Liberation Army officers,67 in 
which they brought forth a broad conception of war reportedly including “all means, military 
and non-military, lethal and non-lethal to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”,68 
which “would require a shift in the minds and thoughts of the Western way of war”.69 It seems 
that with the advent of hybrid, a similar strand of thinking began materialising among 
Western policy-makers. Indeed, one does not have to look far to find examples of prominent 
figures stating that there is a “blurr[ed] line between war and peace”, meaning that there 
exists “a state which is somewhere in between”. 70 This idea is key to understanding the 
                                                 
64 Drent et al., op. cit., p. 23. 
65 H. Gunneriusson & R. Ottis, “Cyberspace from the Hybrid Threat Perspective”, in R. Kuusisto & E. 
Kurkinen (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, 
University of Jyväskylä, 2013, p. 98. 
66 Hoffman, op. cit., 2014. 
67 Ibid. 
68 As quoted in USJFCOM, Irregular Adversaries and Hybrid Threats, Joint Irregular Warfare Center, 2011, 
p. 24. 
69 Davis, op. cit., p. 21. 
70 J. Stoltenberg, as quoted in US Department of Defense, op. cit. 
Jan Jakub Uziębło 
14 
debate about hybrid within both the EU and NATO, as it challenges the core of the Western 
institutional, legal and societal schemata for conceiving war.  
This challenge for some is a need for conceiving war as “a joint civil/military venture, 
top to bottom”.71 Indeed, as Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen critically point out, conflicts no 
longer follow neat phases, fitting a model which can be used to elaborate appropriate 
responses, which can lead to interpreting hybrid war as a permanent state of war.72 As one 
official pointed out, “if you combine the dots, you get a picture that we are already under 
attack, under permanent attack”.73 In this context, situational awareness is key, but it is the 
very nature of our systems of governance which can be seen as impeding an effective 
adaptation to hybrid. Indeed, if hybrid war is perceived as being waged “with at least a 
certain degree of central control”,74 the very identity and institutional set-up of Western 
democracies not only restricts the capacity to carry out hybrid warfare,75 but places the West 
at a significant disadvantage compared to authoritarian systems.76 Indeed, nowadays the 
key concern remains how to couple high military readiness with “the exercise of political 
agility in response to hybrid threat”,77 while vulnerability to salami tactics or “death by a 
thousand cuts” are often mentioned, especially at the intergovernmental level,78 which I will 
now evaluate starting with NATO. 
 
Adapting NATO to hybrid war 
With hybrid warfare becoming the buzzword of choice for NATO, unsurprisingly there was no 
common understanding of the term within the Alliance.79 As evidenced above, hybrid was 
already used by NATO in 2010, at a time when hybrid threats were understood as “those 
posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-
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conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives”.80 Already then, there was a 
growing realisation that NATO is ill-suited to face these threats, the response to which would 
“likely depend on factors outside the current remit of the NATO military sphere”.81 I will now 
analyse how hybrid warfare came to be interpreted within NATO and which policy responses 
were sought.  
 
From different perceptions to a comprehensive approach 
Despite authors like Lindley-French stating that, for NATO, hybrid warfare “exploits political 
[and societal] seams” (using pressure, propaganda, proxies and psychological operations),82 
differentiated perceptions of hybrid were quick to surface among NATO officials. For 
example, within the team tasked with developing the Alliance’s approach towards hybrid 
warfare, one official working on the issue confirmed that he did not particularly like how 
hybrid became an established term, as for him “it is just warfare in the 21st century, where an 
opponent can use every lever in his power”.83 His team thus had to work with a term which 
“everybody agreed was not overly useful”, trying “not to put it on a pedestal”, but instead 
focusing on Russian actions in Ukraine.84 This also seemed to be the dominant view among 
NATO Allies, which reportedly tried “to avoid using the term as much as possible”, instead 
organising separate discussions on different threats simply because “everybody understands 
hybrid differently”.85 One senior official confirmed this by saying that, for him, hybrid warfare 
was “useful from a bureaucratic point of view, raising the issue up the agenda” and allowing 
“to get the military involved in defence planning and developing crisis response measures” 
– in short, guaranteeing a sustained level of attention.86 The official acknowledged however 
that this “is not just a bureaucratic exercise”, because NATO actually “sees hybrid as a form 
of warfare”, aiming to destabilise and render a country more “attackable”.87  
Hybrid was described by some as bringing “a useful, holistic understanding of the 
security challenges from both the East and the South”, which “provides tools for a 
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comparative strategic perspective […], while allowing for a differentiated response” to 
each.88 Indeed, this seems the approach which was adopted by NATO, pointing to an effort 
to ensure the buy-in of all Allies, despite their varying threat prioritisations. In the context of 
the run-up to the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO was focused on its Eastern flank, thus making 
officials ask “how can we stay ahead of Russia?” and describe hybrid warfare as a “game 
of whack-a-mole”.89 In addition, the possibility of simultaneous escalation along a broadly-
defined spectrum of conflict is straining Allied structures. As remarked in a NATO White Paper, 
“[a]dversaries may trigger simultaneous and diverse crises using a hybrid form of warfare that 
challenges our planning, preparation and decision making processes”,90 thus carrying a 
significant risk given the principle of consensus within the organisation.91  
Despite the hype around hybrid, NATO’s approach to hybrid warfare seems largely 
anchored in its previous buzzword: the comprehensive approach (a by-product of NATO 
experiences in Afghanistan and in the Balkans).92 Indeed, Secretary General Stoltenberg 
stated that “hybrid is the dark reflection of our comprehensive approach",93 pointing to a 
certain continuity in NATO’s adaptation efforts.  
Hybrid became a key part of these efforts, however, with the 2015 Report of the NATO 
Secretary General talking about “preparing for, deterring and defending against” hybrid 
warfare.94 Since one of NATO’s core tasks is collective defence, the notion of deterrence has 
long been part of its modus operandi. With hybrid, this question seems more complicated, 
as “hybrid is less ‘deterrable’”.95 Although NATO officials seem to agree that “it is not useful 
deterring hybrid as such”,96 the idea of “deterrence by denial” is established within the 
Alliance.97 This concept, attributed to Glen Snyder, is based on reducing the perceived 
benefit of an action by hardening defences and augmenting the cost of a potential attack, 
as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”.98 As argued by Rühle, in the context of hybrid 
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and its ambiguity, the latter form of deterrence is unlikely to succeed, making “deterrence-
by-resilience” the natural choice for hybrid warfare defence planning. 99  Kramer and 
colleagues, in turn, show that “the requirement for resilience arises because hybrid war, 
including the capacity for cyberattack, has changed the landscape of conflict”.100 As stated 
by one diplomat, “resilience is the other term which had an incredible career recently”,101 
and it is precisely the concept of resilience which was at the core of the 2016 NATO Warsaw 
Summit. 102  Indeed, “ensuring the survivability of government”, 103  resilience of critical 
infrastructure, services104 and society, go hand in hand with NATO’s efforts to ensure the 
ability for quickly moving and deploying forces and equipment to Allied territory.105 Analysing 
Allied priorities in this context, it emerges that formulating concrete reassurance measures for 
the Eastern flank was prioritised over NATO’s work on a strategy to counter hybrid warfare 
(with some states deliberately delaying the latter).106  
Ultimately, for NATO, since “[e]ach hybrid threat is different, and so is each of the 28 
nations’ vulnerabilities”, it is only logical that “[n]ational governments are the first 
responders”, 107  triggering the need to improve intelligence-sharing and establish “early 
warning indicators” of hybrid warfare.108 Indeed, for the Alliance “it appears that knowledge 
and anticipation are the best answer to hybrid threats”.109 This realisation is precisely what 
led NATO to develop guidelines to enhance national resilience to hybrid warfare110 as well 
as to establish a new civil-military Intelligence division, supplemented by sustained efforts to 
“persuade countries to share intelligence”.111 
While Allies adopted assurance-focused measures through the Readiness Action Plan 
in 2014, and a strategy to counter hybrid warfare in December 2015,112 these developments 
should be seen as merely first steps in an overall NATO “strategic realignment”.113 Indeed, 
with NATO facing internal challenges and ones all along the Diplomatic, Information, Military, 
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Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) spectrum,114 specialists 
increasingly talk about a holistic approach,115 or even a “whole of Alliance mobilisation”.116 
As a result, although member states are incentivised to engage in mapping their 
vulnerabilities to Russian influence in specific sectors such as energy, information, or 
finance,117 hybrid warfare mainly presents aspects which fall outside NATO’s competence or 
capabilities.118  
One such area of pivotal importance is strategic communication where, to put it in 
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation’s words, “[NATO] has to gain the battle of the 
narrative”. 119  In this respect, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 
conducted a study on the use of social media “as a weapon of hybrid warfare”, focusing on 
the use of so-called ‘trolls’ by Russia.120 Moreover, addressing vulnerabilities within societies, 
which could “undermine trust in governments”,121 is key for the Alliance in establishing a 
“mind-set of defence […] in social and political venues”. 122  NATO also seeks to foster 
resilience in the private sector, especially in cyber, where according to the Secretary 
General, “it’s actually possible to wage war in a time of peace”.123 
While before the Warsaw Summit Allies were seen as the first responders to hybrid, the 
Alliance has also taken concrete collective steps to address vulnerabilities, first focused on 
its Eastern flank, but increasingly also looking at how to project stability in the South. The 
overall adaptation can nonetheless be seen as following a linear path, largely anchored in 
the comprehensive approach and focused on deliverables it can showcase as examples of 
Allied solidarity. NATO’s approach to hybrid, in sum, can be described as pragmatic and the 
hybrid label as not particularly relevant. On the other hand, another actor seems to be 
particularly well fit for addressing hybrid, namely the EU. 
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Europe countering hybrid threats 
In general, the EU does not speak about hybrid warfare, preferring the phrase hybrid threats. 
There are nonetheless many exceptions to this rule. An anecdotal but telling example for the 
EU’s lack of coherence, was a video released by the Council of the EU, which provided the 
following definition of hybrid threats in its metadata: “[h]ybrid threats are a combination of 
military and non-military means. The objective is to destabilise opponents, create confusion, 
mask the real situation on the ground and hamper decision-making”.124 This speaks to the 
fact that, although the EU does not have an agreed definition of hybrid threats, an increasing 
number of policy responses were being drafted to ‘counter’ them, raising the need to 
develop ways to communicate on the issue to the public. In light of these responses, it is 
important to understand the EU’s approach to hybrid threats, which already in 2015 the EU’s 
High Representative Mogherini (HR/VP) called “the new normal”. 125 
The beginning of an EU policy response to hybrid can be traced to the drafting of 
several member states’ non-papers on the issue in early 2015. One such non-paper, drafted 
by the Nordic Group,126 was presented at the informal meeting of EU defence chiefs in Riga 
in February 2015, focusing on Russia and calling for European unity.127 Similar documents 
were later drafted by France (focusing on the southern flank) and by Finland (focusing on 
resilience). Consequently, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) was tasked with developing an initial document for 
discussion, which was circulated in May 2015.128 Furthermore, both the Latvian and the 
subsequent Luxembourgish rotating EU Presidencies drafted unofficial background notes, 
providing context and recommendations on possible ways forward. Officially, however, the 
process started with the invitation by the May 2015 Foreign Affairs Council, to the European 
Commission and HR/VP to draft a joint framework on hybrid threats “with actionable 
proposals”, an invitation further reiterated by the June European Council.129 
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The EU sought to take all member states’ concerns into consideration, through the 
organisation of consultations aimed at securing the buy-in for any EU-level solutions. 130 
Similarly to the misperception hybrid caused within NATO, this all-inclusive approach led to 
confusion within the EU. As a result, the European Commission pushed for creating a definition 
of the term,131 in order to clear the semantic and legal blurriness. Interestingly, the EU Military 
Staff initially drafted a document arguing against the use of hybrid terminology,132 which was 
ultimately discarded.133 This example of institutional disagreements over the utility of hybrid is 
indicative of a level of fragmentation and persisting ‘silos’ within EU institutions, even the ones 
located in a same building. Ultimately, a certain convergence finally emerged, 
characterised by one official as the need “to do something […] at least speak the same 
language”.134 Similarly, another official asserted that hybrid is “just a bumper-sticker” and 
that in the end, it “does not need a definition […] as long as we know what we mean by 
it”.135 
A difference to NATO is the EU’s consciously civilian approach. Drent and colleagues 
have shown that in the EU, in the context of hybrid, “the word ‘warfare’ is consciously 
avoided”,136 because of the opposition of certain member states. The EU’s ‘Joint Framework 
on Countering Hybrid Threats’ is illustrative of this. The document states that  
[w]hile definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond to their 
evolving nature the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive and subversive 
activity, conventional and unconventional methods […], which can be used in a 
coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while 
remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.137 
I would argue that this rationalisation for a lack of definition seems to have been dictated by 
the inability to provide one, rather than a need for flexibility. This is illustrated by an earlier 
CMPD document on the subject stating that 
[h]ybrid warfare can be more easily characterised than defined as a centrally 
designed and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, enacted by military 
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and/or non-military means, ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through 
economic pressure to the use of conventional forces.138 
These differences of perception are significant, especially given the initial prominence of the 
CMPD in shaping the EU’s overall response to hybrid, resulting in an approach similar to the 
one of NATO. Indeed, CMPD authors argued that “hybrid attacks” are “designed to exploit 
a country’s vulnerabilities”, can “generate ambiguity both in the affected population” and 
internationally with the “aim to swamp a government”.139 The emphasis on vulnerabilities, 
present in all member states, means mapping them – at times a sensitive issue – should be 
the first step towards building resilience.140 Nonetheless, if these vulnerabilities are present at 
the member state level, how does the EU see its role in countering them? 
Many authors and officials asserted that the EU is “well placed” to counter hybrid 
threat.141 Despite this, the EU officially recognised that “responding to and countering [hybrid 
threat] is and will remain a national responsibility”.142 Indeed, the EU’s role is described as a 
“platform” for harmonising responses on specific issues like critical infrastructure,143 as well as 
providing an “added value” on awareness, resilience and response.144 This approach is thus 
one in which “a good number of the indicators and warnings from across the broad range 
of EU competencies” are already available,145 the challenge being “strengthen[ing] [the] 
ability to recognise, prevent, counter and defend against hybrid threats”.146 This can be seen 
in EU policy responses, as I will show below. 
 
From ambiguous threats to catch-all policy responses 
The EU’s approach to countering hybrid threat materialised in April 2016, when the Council 
welcomed “the Joint Communication on countering hybrid threat and fostering resilience of 
the EU and its Member States as well as partners”, and invited the Commission and the HR/VP 
“to provide a report by July 2017 to assess progress” on this topic. 147  The Council also 
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highlighted “the need for closer dialogue, coordination and cooperation with NATO”.148 
These conclusions were a product of months of negotiations. Their actionable nature meant 
22 actions were put forward in the ‘Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats’.149 
While the tangible impact of this document should be the subject of a separate 
analysis, a brief examination is essential for understanding the EU’s responses to hybrid. First, 
it is crucial to note that actions relating to critical infrastructure form the bulk of EU responses, 
reflecting the Commission’s previous work in this area, but also the fact that critical 
infrastructure protection is relevant for both the southern and eastern dimensions of hybrid. 
As a result, the Commission is set to support energy diversification and resilience (including 
cyber), monitor emerging threats and develop responses concerning transport infrastructure 
(including cyber), increase the resilience of space infrastructure against hybrid threats, as 
well as improve awareness, cooperation and resilience in cybersecurity.150 
Another axis for proposed action are efforts to improve awareness and information-
sharing, cutting through the ambiguity of hybrid (although the vagueness of these proposals 
is striking). Indeed, the HR/VP “will launch a hybrid risk survey” in the EU’s neighbourhood151 
and support the member states in launching their own “hybrid risk survey”.152 Similarly, the 
Commission will aim to identify common tools and indicators for the protection of critical 
infrastructure, as well as “promote and facilitate information-sharing platforms and networks” 
in cyber-security.153 The flagship initiative to address the ambiguity of hybrid is the creation 
of “an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell” within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre.154 This (very) 
small structure was designed to “see the patterns” of a ‘hybrid campaign’ in information 
provided by member states and EU bodies,155 while cooperating with NATO156 in order to 
provide top EU decision-makers with better situational awareness. 157  Although limited in 
scope and needing time for implementation, this policy response has the merit of being new, 
as opposed to most actions which were in the legislative pipeline regardless of hybrid. One 
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example is the ‘actionable proposal’ in the section dealing with “targeting hybrid threat 
financing”, which is a re-framing of an existing EU measure for fighting terrorist financing.158 
It is worth exploring the idea of deterrence in the EU’s response to hybrid threats. 
Although one official asserted that in the EU “we do not deter”, the focus being on 
resilience,159 this seems inaccurate. Indeed, while the Joint Framework does not mention 
deterrence per se, several elements do point in that direction. Deterrence-like signalling 
within the text can be seen in the discussion of a possible invocation of Article 42 (7) TEU to 
provide a response in case of “multiple serious hybrid threats consitut[ing] armed aggression 
against an EU Member State”, as well as in the mention of a possible increased cooperation 
with NATO following “a wide-ranging and serious manifestation of hybrid threats”. 160 
Interestingly enough, in an area often cited as a potential EU strength on hybrid, namely the 
Union’s ability to impose sanctions, only the following sentence can be found: “[i]n the 
context of CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] instruments, tailored and effective 
restrictive measures could be explored to counter hybrid threats”.161 Overall, although the EU 
indeed does not subscribe to the deterrence concept, this does not mean that it does not 
signal its deterrence-by-denial toolbox.162 
To conclude, the EU’s response to hybrid threats can be seen as a mix of existing 
measures alongside new attempts to address vulnerabilities and improve situational 
awareness. To paraphrase one of the officials I spoke with, the EU’s approach is mainly 
reactive because only a specific combination of hybrid elements in a systematic fashion 
makes a campaign hybrid – adapting is therefore a question of mind-set.163 One of the 
aspects of this new mind set is to look for synergies with likeminded partners, as exemplified 
by NATO-EU cooperation.   
 
A hybrid partnership  
While NATO-EU cooperation outside of the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements is mired by political 
obstacles, in the context of hybrid a new dynamic of engagement has emerged. In a 
situation of perceived urgency, member states of both organisations granted more leeway 
to staff to improve cooperation and find synergies. This new momentum, in turn, allowed 
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both organisations to progressively deepen their relationship, despite political blockages. 
Despite the slow progress of formal EU-NATO cooperation, hybrid set the tone for closer 
NATO-EU institutional relations. In this respect, the evolution of the unofficial staff-to-staff 
contacts seems significant, as it paved the way for subsequent developments in EU-NATO 
cooperation. 
 
A hybrid opportunity 
The High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will continue informal 
dialogue and enhance cooperation and coordination with NATO on situational 
awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity and ‘crisis prevention and 
response’ to counter hybrid threats, respecting the principles of inclusiveness and 
autonomy of each organisation’s decision making process.164 
The May 2016 EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on hybrid threats stressed “that co-
operation with NATO had to be at the heart of the EU’s CSDP” [Common Security and 
Defence Policy].165 The emphasis on cooperation between the two organisations was largely 
a product of several Ministers’ insistence, pushing for working with NATO especially on the 
issue of strategic communications in the context of Russian actions in Ukraine. 166  The 
prominence of NATO for the EU in the context of hybrid was also a question of timing. Indeed, 
there was “a unique opportunity begging” in the fact that “[n]either the EU nor NATO [had] 
a strategy to counter hybrid threats” and that both could build “complementary and 
mutually supporting strategies”,167 with the Alliance being seen as “an integral part of [EU] 
planned actions” on hybrid.168  
Closer relations being a key objective for some states like the UK169 or Poland,170 hybrid 
provided an opportunity to seek “new ways of cooperation”, 171  including efforts to 
strengthen the informal dialogue between the two organisations. 172  The leadership and 
good relationship of NATO’s Secretary General and the EU’s HR/VP proved instrumental for 
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closer relations. Hybrid also became a priority of the rotating Presidency held by the 
Netherlands,173 culminating in the EU-NATO Joint Declaration on the margins of the Warsaw 
Summit and its subsequent implementation process, the clear majority of the proposals 
having an explicit or implicit hybrid dimension.174 In general, the discussion on hybrid threats 
significantly contributed to further NATO-EU coordination. 
 
Cooperation out of necessity? 
The absence of an effective official framework for EU-NATO cooperation has been described 
by one European Foreign Affairs Minister as “a threat to European security, particularly in the 
face of hybrid threats”.175 Similarly, the European Defence Agency (EDA) Chief Executive 
stated that EU-NATO cooperation on hybrid “is not an option, but an absolute necessity”.176 
These statements point to perceived vulnerabilities in both organisations, from which a 
generalised feeling of urgency can be inferred, explaining efforts to understand “who does 
what and when”.177 
The EDA Chief Executive brought some clarity in this regard, stating that “[t]he 
deterrence effect of NATO and the complementarity of [EU] tools and instruments, are more 
than enough reason to enhance our cooperation”.178 In this vein, the following calculus 
seems to have emerged, in which “the EU possesses many of the capabilities that NATO does 
not, [including] the ability to broadly assess Europe’s vulnerabilities, and to produce a ‘risk 
register’ of areas including critical national infrastructure to help indicate when hybrid 
actions might be under way”.179 Indeed, while both the EU and NATO see their member 
states as the “first responders” on hybrid, “closer cooperation between [both organisations] 
can make [their] assistance more focused and more effective”.180 
                                                 
173  D. Boytha, Priority Dossiers under the Dutch EU Council Presidency, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, PE 573.880, p. 8. 
174 Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the 
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary 
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, 15283/16, 2016, pp. 1-11. 
175 Waszczykowski, op. cit.  
176 EDA Press Release, Countering Hybrid Threats: ‘Capabilities need to be used in a more coherent 
and comprehensive manner’ (Jorge Domecq), 4 March 2016. 
177 Stoltenberg as quoted in P. Pernik, EU and NATO: Enhancing Cooperation to Counter Hybrid Threats, 
European Leadership Network, Online Article, 2015. 
178 EDA Press Release, op. cit., 2016.  
179 The Military Balance, The Military Balance 2016, Routledge, p. 5. 
180 J. Stoltenberg as quoted in NATO Press Release, Secretary General: NATO and the EU Working 
Closer Together than Ever before, February 2015. 
Jan Jakub Uziębło 
26 
This line of thinking was in particular evident concerning topics “related to economic 
measures, energy, cyber and so on” in which NATO was perceived to need additional 
means.181 Cyber in particular has to be viewed as the area in which most has been achieved 
by both organisations – the signing of a Technical Arrangement by the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability and the EU’s Computer Emergency Response Team in 2016 is 
a prime example. 182  Hailed by the EEAS as “an important milestone to implement the 
objectives of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework”,183 the agreement was in fact an 
institutionalisation of unclassified184 information exchange, allowing for structured staff-to-
staff contacts between the two bodies – a relatively minor development with a symbolic 
dimension, in an inter-institutional context where “symbols do matter”. 185  Similarly, the 
prominence of cyber in the process of implementation of the NATO-EU Joint Declaration 
further illustrates this point. 
Indeed, a key dimension of NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid seems to be the very 
symbolism it can bring to bear in the current crises facing Europe. One such issue with an 
impact on European public opinion was the migration crisis. Seen as a “key test of relevance” 
for the Alliance, 186  it led to NATO engaging its naval assets in patrolling the Aegean, 
exchanging information with the EU’s Frontex through liaison officers,187 as well as the launch 
of NATO Operation Sea Guardian to support EUNAVFOR MED in the Mediterranean.188 
Overall, the process of implementation of the NATO-EU Joint Declaration has to be 
analysed in the context of discussions on hybrid, while keeping in mind the Cyprus-Turkey 
issue impeding fully-fledged cooperation between the two institutions. Any new 
development in interinstitutional cooperation is a product of months of intense negotiations 
among the two organisations, but also between their constituent bodies and member states, 
and, in some cases even between individual national ministries. In practice, this means that 
any development in the official NATO-EU relationship is dwarfed in scope by unofficial 
interactions which made it happen at the staff level. In this context, it can be said without 
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doubt that it is the sense of urgency created by hybrid, and especially by Russian actions in 
Ukraine, which created the “new impetus” in the official EU-NATO relationship.189  
 
Condemned to unofficial coordination 
To counter hybrid in a coordinated fashion, NATO has been engaged in (mostly) unofficial 
talks with the EU in four different areas: “civil-military planning, cyber-defence, information-
sharing and strategic communications”.190 Several unofficial 28-to-28 meetings took place in 
early 2016, with intelligence sharing proving the most contentious topic of discussion at the 
time.191 These meeting were, however, merely one manifestation of the increasing contacts 
between the two institutions. Indeed, as noted by Pernik, “the frequency and topic areas of 
staff-to-staff meetings have grown, both at political and expert levels and the informal 
cooperation network functions well”.192 Equally important, despite blockages on information 
sharing between the two organisations, as confirmed by several of my interviews, 
“information is being shared in brown envelopes” and regular staff meetings are being 
encouraged.193 
Another aspect of this unofficial cooperation is linked to COEs. The European Centre 
for Countering Hybrid Threats, currently being set up in Finland, has the potential to be 
significant in this respect. Indeed, COEs present the advantage that they “are half-in, half-
out” of their institutional setting, which opens possibilities for cooperation with outside 
partners.194 The planned COE would thus be able to cooperate with all NATO COEs which 
deal with issues connected to hybrid (such as counterterrorism, cyber, CBRN, energy etc.), 
thus feeding into coordinated policy responses of both organisations. It remains to be seen 
though whether this new COE will be doing anything more than “raising awareness from an 
academic point of view”.195 On the other hand, the new centre could be an added value, 
especially if it is set up as more than just an academic institution, on the lines of the more 
‘operational’ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Estonia.196 
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While some officials still seem to see some sort of a competition between NATO and 
the EU,197 most seem to perceive this mind-set as outdated.198 A related issue is to what extent 
the levels of unofficial cooperation are sustainable and themselves resilient against hybrid. 
As stated by one NATO official, both the Union and the Alliance “would like to see a more 
organised way of doing it [but] both organisations first need to sort themselves out 
internally”.199 A similar picture has been presented to me by an EU official, who stated that 
the hybrid discussion had the potential of having a positive impact on intra-EU coordination, 
which so far is “almost non-existent”.200 Despite limited developments in official NATO-EU 
cooperation in 2016/17, the conclusion for now still seems to be that the status quo remains 
the rule. 
To conclude, it can be said that the current levels of EU-NATO cooperation are largely 
a product of the hybrid threat context. While both official high-level and unofficial staff 
contacts have increased, most cooperation arrangements remain ad hoc and limited to 
certain policy areas carefully negotiated by member states of both organisations and the 
organisations themselves. On the other hand, changing staff mind-sets in both organisations, 
slowly push new synergies to the surface, as well as crystallising relationships and working 
methods, which have the potential to outlive the hybrid terminology. 
 
Conclusion 
Hybrid has been around for a decade, gradually transforming and diffusing across the 
Atlantic. In doing so, it could give the impression that “perhaps the most successful 
manifestation of hybrid warfare, [was] the confusion it caused in terms of our vocabulary”.201 
In my opinion, the emergence and persistence of the hybrid terminology points to the 
demand for new ways to describe what some see as novel challenges. To a certain extent, 
the progressive dilution of the meaning of this terminology is the result of similarly elusive 
processes to those it seeks to describe. Hybrid should be seen as a manifestation of an 
inability to fit current security challenges within previously delineated schemata for 
conceiving war. Indeed, by virtue of its diffusion in policy-making and expert communities, in 
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particular via NATO, the malleable term became the canvass upon which different 
institutional actors and nations could project their threat perceptions.  
Through extensive research, I have shown that hybrid war and hybrid threats have 
been deduced by ‘looking in the mirror’ – thus being a product of self-diagnosed 
vulnerabilities. It is precisely this perception and the vague nature of this terminology, which 
led both NATO and the EU to adapt hybrid to describe a changing security environment to 
which no clear policy responses existed.  The need for a novel concept points to a growing 
realisation that Western models of war and peace were inadequate to describe a rapidly 
evolving strategic international environment. As such, the hybrid label is not about Russia or 
the Islamic State, but rather seeks to communicate a state of urgency at a time of nominal 
peace.  
While perceptions of what hybrid is differ within NATO and the EU, there seems to be 
a growing consensus that both organisations need to adapt. A perception of vulnerability 
and a sense of urgency is what led both organisations to seek synergies in their respective 
policy responses, resulting in a qualitative change in their informal staff-to-staff interactions, 
and ultimately, in increased formal NATO-EU cooperation. Hybrid was a useful concept for 
both organisations, vague enough to secure the buy-in of all NATO and EU member states, 
and to facilitate EU-NATO communication despite the lack of precise agreement on what 
hybrid means. 
No clear-cut definitions and categorisations are needed to understand that the West 
lags behind in adapting to a networked security environment, where power is more diffused 
on all levels. Seeing the patterns is easy, starting to adapt is harder, but the real challenge is 
to communicate these changes to decision-makers and populations. In this sense, hybrid 
was a useful communication tool, but its inherent vagueness carries the risk of suboptimal 
policy outcomes, especially when policy-makers, media, think tanks and politicians start 
using this terminology in disparate ways. 
While the EU deliberately chose hybrid threats over hybrid warfare to emphasise a 
‘comprehensive’ response mostly anchored in its civilian nature, NATO concentrated on 
showcasing Allied solidarity and putting more emphasis on projecting stability outside its 
borders. I have nonetheless shown that in both cases, the hybrid terminology has almost not 
altered the EU or NATO internal processes and policy proposals. What it did achieve, was 
pushing existing adaptation programmes to the top of the agenda, showcasing internal 
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inadequacies and the need for both organisations to work closer together. All in all, despite 
its flaws, hybrid brought NATO and the EU closer together in challenging times. 
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